



Certification Report

EAL 2+ Evaluation of McAfee Network Data Loss Prevention 9.2

Issued by:

Communications Security Establishment Canada

Certification Body

Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme

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Document number: 383-4-170-CR
Version: 1.0
Date: 14 March 2012
Pagination: i to iii, 1 to 8



DISCLAIMER

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established under the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) – using the *Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3*, for conformance to the *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3*. This certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the CCS, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by the Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.

FOREWORD

The Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the CCS Certification Body, which is managed by the Communications Security Establishment Canada.

A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the CCS Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of *ISO/IEC 17025:2005, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories*. Accreditation is performed under the Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN), administered by the Standards Council of Canada.

The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is EWA-Canada located in Ottawa, Canada.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the security requirements.

This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 14 March 2012, and the security target identified in Section 4 of this report.

The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted on the CCS Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the Common Criteria Project).

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Executive Summary

McAfee Network Data Loss Prevention 9.2 (hereafter referred to as McAfee NDLP), from McAfee, Inc., is the Target of Evaluation for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2 augmented evaluation.

McAfee NDLP is a Data Loss Prevention product. It protects enterprises from the risk associated with unauthorized transfer of data from within or outside the organization. It is a distributed software TOE that is composed of 4 components; McAfee Network DLP Discover, McAfee Network DLP Monitor, McAfee Network DLP Prevent, and McAfee Network DLP Manager.

EWA-Canada is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 27 February 2012 and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS).

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for McAfee NDLP, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

The results documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)¹ for this product provide sufficient evidence that it meets the EAL 2 augmented assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. The evaluation was conducted using the *Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3*, for conformance to the *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3*. The following augmentation is claimed: ALC_FLR.2 – Flaw Reporting Procedures

Communications Security Establishment Canada, as the CCS Certification Body, declares that the McAfee NDLP evaluation meets all the conditions of the *Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates* and that the product will be listed on the CCS Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the Common Criteria Project).

¹ The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.

1 Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2 augmented evaluation is McAfee Network Data Loss Prevention 9.2 (hereafter referred to as McAfee NDLP), from McAfee, Inc.

2 TOE Description

McAfee NDLP is a Data Loss Prevention product. It protects enterprises from the risk associated with unauthorized transfer of data from within or outside the organization. It is a distributed software TOE that is composed of 4 components; McAfee Network DLP Discover, McAfee Network DLP Monitor, McAfee Network DLP Prevent, and McAfee Network DLP Manager.

A detailed description of the McAfee NDLP architecture is found in Sections 1.6 and 1.7 of the Security Target (ST).

3 Evaluated Security Functionality

The complete list of evaluated security functionality for McAfee NDLP is identified in Sections 1.7.2 and 6.1 of the ST.

4 Security Target

The ST associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following nomenclature:

Title: Security Target: McAfee Network Data Loss Prevention 9.2

Version: v1.1

Date: 8 March 2012

5 Common Criteria Conformance

The evaluation was conducted using the *Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3*, for conformance to the *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3*.

McAfee NDLP is:

- a. *Common Criteria Part 2 conformant*, with security functional requirements based only upon functional components in Part 2;
- b. *Common Criteria Part 3 conformant*, with security assurance requirements based only upon assurance components in Part 3; and
- c. *Common Criteria EAL 2 augmented*, containing all security assurance requirements in the EAL 2 package, as well as the following: ALC_FLR.2 – Flaw Reporting Procedures

6 Security Policy

McAfee NDLP implements a role-based access control policy to control user access to the system, as well as an information flow control policy to control information entering the system; details of these security policies can be found in Section 7 of the ST.

In addition, McAfee NDLP implements policies pertaining to policy enforcement, security audit, identification and authentication, and security management. Further details on these security policies may be found in Section 7 of the ST.

7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

Consumers of McAfee NDLP should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product's installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.

7.1 Secure Usage Assumptions

The following Secure Usage Assumptions are listed in the ST:

- The authorized administrators are neither careless, willfully negligent, nor hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the TOE documentation.
- The TOE will be managed in a manner that allows it to appropriately address changes in the IT System the TOE monitors.
- There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it contains.

7.2 Environmental Assumptions

The following Environmental Assumptions are listed in the ST:

- The TOE has access to all the IT System data it needs to perform its functions.
- The TOE hardware and software critical to security policy enforcement will be protected from unauthorized physical modification.
- The processing resources of the TOE will be located within controlled access facilities, which will prevent unauthorized physical access.
- Access to the database used by the TOE via mechanisms outside the TOE boundary is restricted to use by authorized users.

7.3 Clarification of Scope

McAfee NDLP offers protection against inadvertent or casual attempts to breach system security by unsophisticated attackers possessing basic attack potential. McAfee NDLP is not intended for situations which involve determined attempts by hostile or well-funded attackers using sophisticated attack techniques.

8 Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration for McAfee NDLP comprises:

TOE Software

- NDLP Manager Version 9.2 Build 1827
- NDLP Discover Version 9.2 Build 1648
- NDLP Prevent Version 9.2 Build 1264
- NDLP Monitor Version 9.2 Build 1419

IT Environment

- DLP 4400 Appliance
- MLOS Version 2.6.27 Build 19
- VMware ESX/ESXi 4.1 Update 1 and later

The publication entitled: Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures Supplement: McAfee Network Data Loss Prevention 9.2 describes the procedures necessary to install and operate McAfee NDLP in its evaluated configuration.

9 Documentation

The McAfee, Inc. documents provided to the consumer are as follows:

- a. Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures Supplement: McAfee Network Data Loss Prevention 9.2
- b. Installation Guide McAfee Data Loss Prevention 9.2 Virtual Appliance
- c. Release Notes: McAfee Total Protection for Data Loss Prevention 9.2.0 Software
- d. Quick Start Guide: McAfee Total Protection for DLP Version 9.2.0; and
- e. Product Guide: McAfee Total Protection for Data Loss Prevention 9.2 Software.

10 Evaluation Analysis Activities

The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of McAfee NDLP, including the following areas:

Development: The evaluators analyzed the McAfee NDLP functional specification and design documentation; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces, the TSF subsystems and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements (SFRs). The evaluators analyzed the McAfee NDLP security architectural description and determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained. The evaluators also independently verified that the correspondence mappings between the design documents are correct.

Guidance Documents: The evaluators examined the McAfee NDLP preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.

Life-cycle support: An analysis of the McAfee NDLP configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the McAfee NDLP configuration items were clearly marked. The developer's configuration management system was observed during a site visit, and it was found to be mature and well-developed.

The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures required to maintain the integrity of McAfee NDLP during distribution to the consumer.

The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by McAfee, Inc. for McAfee NDLP. During a site visit, the evaluators also examined the evidence generated by adherence to the procedures. The evaluators concluded that the procedures are adequate to report, track and correct security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and corrections to consumers of the product.

Vulnerability assessment: The evaluators conducted an independent vulnerability analysis of McAfee NDLP. Additionally, the evaluators conducted a search of public domain vulnerability databases to identify McAfee NDLP potential vulnerabilities. The evaluators identified potential vulnerabilities for testing applicable to McAfee NDLP in its operational environment.

All these evaluation activities resulted in **PASS** verdicts.

11 ITS Product Testing

Testing at EAL 2 consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.

11.1 Assessment of Developer Tests

The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR².

The evaluators analyzed the developer's test coverage analysis and found it to be complete and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer's test documentation and the functional specification was complete.

11.2 Independent Functional Testing

During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance documentation, examining the developer's test documentation, executing a sample of the developer's test cases, and creating test cases that augmented the developer tests.

All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. Resulting from this test coverage approach is the following list of EWA-Canada test goals:

- a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The objective of this test goal is to repeat a subset of the developer's tests;

² The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.

- b. Audit: The objective of this test goal is to verify the NDLP Manager will maintain audit logs for all registered appliances;
- c. Policy Enforcement: The objective of this test goal is to verify that the TOE can scan for terms defined in concepts to a match count; and
- d. Identification and Authentication: The objective of this test goal is to verify that strong passwords can be used by the TOE.

11.3 Independent Penetration Testing

Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables, limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:

- a. Search of public domain security sites to determine if there are any known or potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited;
- b. Attempting to bypass login credentials using underlying OS login credentials; and
- c. Attempts to hijack the session ID of the active user.

The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.

11.4 Conduct of Testing

McAfee NDLP was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The testing took place at the Information Technology Security Evaluation and Test (ITSET) Facility at EWA-Canada. The CCS Certification Body witnessed a portion of the independent testing. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.

11.5 Testing Results

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, giving assurance that McAfee NDLP behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.

12 Results of the Evaluation

This evaluation has provided the basis for an EAL 2+ level of assurance. The overall verdict for the evaluation is **PASS**. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.

13 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations

The TOE comes with a complete set of easy to follow guidance documentation.

14 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations

<u>Acronym/Abbreviation/ Initialization</u>	<u>Description</u>
CCEF	Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CCS	Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
CPL	Certified Products list
CM	Configuration Management
DLP	Data Loss Prevention
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
IT	Information Technology
ITSET	Information Technology Security Evaluation and Testing
MLOS	McAfee Linux Operating System
PALCAN	Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation

15 References

This section lists all documentation used as source material for this report:

- a. CCS Publication #4, Technical Oversight, Version 1.8, October 2010.
- b. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009.
- c. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009.
- d. Security Target: McAfee Network Data Loss Prevention 9.2, v1.1, 8 March 2012.
- e. Evaluation Technical Report for EAL 2+ Common Criteria Evaluation of McAfee, Inc. McAfee Network Data Loss Prevention 9.2, v1.4, 27 February 2012.